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Abstract
Black box machine learning models are currently being used for high stakes decision-making throughout
society, causing problems throughout healthcare, criminal justice, and in other domains. People have hoped
that creating methods for explaining these black box models will alleviate some of these problems, but trying
to explain black box models, rather than creating models that are interpretable in the first place, is likely to
perpetuate bad practices and can potentially cause catastrophic harm to society. There is a way forward – it is
to design models that are inherently interpretable. This manuscript clarifies the chasm between explaining
black boxes and using inherently interpretable models, outlines several key reasons why explainable black
boxes should be avoided in high-stakes decisions, identifies challenges to interpretable machine learning, and
provides several example applications where interpretable models could potentially replace black box models
in criminal justice, healthcare, and computer vision.
1 Introduction
There has been an increasing trend in healthcare and criminal justice to leverage machine learning (ML) for
high-stakes prediction applications that deeply impact human lives. Many of the ML models are black boxes that
do not explain their predictions in a way that humans can understand. The lack of transparency and accountability
of predictive models can have (and has already had) severe consequences; there have been cases of people
incorrectly denied parole [1], poor bail decisions leading to the release of dangerous criminals, ML-based
pollution models stating that highly polluted air was safe to breathe [2], and generally poor use of limited
valuable resources in criminal justice, medicine, energy reliability, finance, and in other domains [3].
Rather than trying to create models that are inherently interpretable, there has been a recent explosion of
work on “Explainable ML,” where a second (posthoc) model is created to explain the first black box model. This
is problematic. Explanations are often not reliable, and can be misleading, as we discuss below. If we instead
use models that are inherently interpretable, they provide their own explanations, which are faithful to what the
model actually computes.
In what follows, we discuss the problems with Explainable ML, followed by the challenges in Interpretable
ML. This document is mainly relevant to high-stakes decision making and troubleshooting models, which are the
main two reasons one might require an interpretable or explainable model. Interpretability is a domain-specific
notion [4, 5, 6, 7], so there cannot be an all-purpose definition. Usually, however, an interpretable machine
learning model is constrained in model form so that it is either useful to someone, or obeys structural knowledge
of the domain, such as monotonicity [e.g., 8], causality, structural (generative) constraints, additivity [9], or
physical constraints that come from domain knowledge. Interpretable models could use case-based reasoning for
complex domains. Often for structured data, sparsity is a useful measure of interpretability, since humans can
handle at most 7±2 cognitive entities at once [10, 11]. Sparse models allow a view of how variables interact
jointly rather than individually. We will discuss several forms of interpretable machine learning models for
different applications below, but there can never be a single definition; e.g., in some domains, sparsity is useful,
and in others is it not. There is a spectrum between fully transparent models (where we understand how all the
variables are jointly related to each other) and models that are lightly constrained in model form (such as models
that are forced to increase as one of the variables increases, or models that, all else being equal, prefer variables
that domain experts have identified as important, see [12]).
A preliminary version of this manuscript appeared at a workshop, entitled “Please Stop Explaining Black
Box Machine Learning Models for High Stakes Decisions” [13].
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2 Key Issues with Explainable ML
A black box model could be either (i) a function that is too complicated for any human to comprehend, or (ii) a
function that is proprietary (see Appendix A). Deep learning models, for instance, tend to be black boxes of
the first kind because they are highly recursive. As the term is presently used in its most common form, an
explanation is a separate model that is supposed to replicate most of the behavior of a black box (e.g., “the black
box says that people who have been delinquent on current credit are more likely to default on a new loan”). Note
that the term “explanation” here refers to an understanding of how a model works, as opposed to an explanation
of how the world works. The terminology “explanation” will be discussed later; it is misleading.
I am concerned that the field of interpretability/explainability/comprehensibility/transparency in machine
learning has strayed away from the needs of real problems. This field dates back to the early 90’s at least [see
4, 14], and there are a huge number of papers on interpretable ML in various fields (that often do not have the
word “interpretable” or “explainable” in the title, as the recent papers do). Recent work on explainability of
black boxes – rather than interpretability of models – contains and perpetuates critical misconceptions that have
generally gone unnoticed, but that can have a lasting negative impact on the widespread use of machine learning
models in society. Let us spend some time discussing this before discussing possible solutions.
(i) It is a myth that there is necessarily a trade-off between accuracy and interpretability.
There is a widespread belief that more complex models are more accurate, meaning that a complicated black
box is necessary for top predictive performance. However, this is often not true, particularly when the data are
structured, with a good representation in terms of naturally meaningful features. When considering problems that
have structured data with meaningful features, there is often no significant difference in performance between
more complex classifiers (deep neural networks, boosted decision trees, random forests) and much simpler
classifiers (logistic regression, decision lists) after preprocessing. (Appendix B discusses this further.) In data
science problems, where structured data with meaningful features are constructed as part of the data science
process, there tends to be little difference between algorithms, assuming that the data scientist follows a standard
process for knowledge discovery [such as KDD, CRISP-DM, or BigData, see 15, 16, 17].
Even for applications such as computer vision, where deep learning has major performance gains, and where
interpretability is much more difficult to define, some forms of interpretability can be imbued directly into the
models without losing accuracy. This will be discussed more later in the Challenges section. Uninterpretable
algorithms can still be useful in high-stakes decisions as part of the knowledge discovery process, for instance,
to obtain baseline levels of performance, but they are not generally the final goal of knowledge discovery.
Figure 1, taken from the DARPA Explainable Artificial Intelligence program’s Broad Agency Announcement
[18], exemplifies a blind belief in the myth of the accuracy-interpretability trade-off. This not a “real” figure,
in that it was not generated by any data. The axes have no quantification (there is no specific meaning to
the horizontal or vertical axes). The image appears to illustrate an experiment with a static dataset, where
several machine learning algorithms are applied to the same dataset. However, this kind of smooth accu-
racy/interpretability/explainability trade-off is atypical in data science applications with meaningful features.
Even if one were to quantify the interpretability/explainability axis and aim to show that such a trade-off did
exist, it is not clear what algorithms would be applied to produce this figure. (Would one actually claim it
is fair to compare the 1984 decision tree algorithm CART to a 2018 deep learning model and conclude that
interpretable models are not as accurate?) One can always create an artificial trade-off between accuracy and
interpretability/explainability by removing parts of a more complex model to reduce accuracy, but this is not
representative of the analysis one would perform on a real problem. It is also not clear why the comparison should
be performed on a static dataset, because any formal process for defining knowledge from data [15, 16, 17]
would require an iterative process, where one refines the data processing after interpreting the results. Generally,
in the practice of data science, the small difference in performance between machine learning algorithms can be
overwhelmed by the ability to interpret results and process the data better at the next iteration [19]. In those
cases, the accuracy/interpretability tradeoff is reversed – more interpretability leads to better overall accuracy,
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Figure 1: A fictional depiction of the “accuracy-interpretability trade-off,” taken from the DARPA XAI (Explain-
able Artificial Intelligence) Broad Agency Announcement [18].
not worse.
Efforts working within a knowledge discovery process led me to work in interpretable machine learning [20].
Specifically, I participated in a large-scale effort to predict electrical grid failures across New York City. The
data were messy, including free text documents (trouble tickets), accounting data about electrical cables from as
far back as the 1890’s, inspections data from a brand new manhole inspections program; even the structured data
were not easily integrated into a database, and there were confounding issues and other problems. Algorithms on
a static dataset were at most 1% different in performance, but the ability to interpret and reprocess the data led to
significant improvements in performance, including correcting problems with the dataset, and revealing false
assumptions about the data generation process. The most accurate predictors we found were sparse models with
meaningful features that were constructed through the iterative process.
The belief that there is always a trade-off between accuracy and interpretability has led many researchers to
forgo the attempt to produce an interpretable model. This problem is compounded by the fact that researchers
are now trained in deep learning, but not in interpretable machine learning. Worse, toolkits of machine learning
algorithms offer little in the way of useful interfaces for interpretable machine learning methods.
To our knowledge, all recent review and commentary articles on this topic imply (implicitly or explicitly)
that the trade-off between interpretability and accuracy generally occurs. It could be possible that there are
application domains where a complete black box is required for a high stakes decision. As of yet, I have not
encountered such an application, despite having worked on numerous applications in healthcare and criminal
justice [e.g., 21], energy reliability [e.g., 20], and financial risk assessment [e.g., 22].
(ii) Explainable ML methods provide explanations that are not faithful to what the original model com-
putes.
Explanations must be wrong. They cannot have perfect fidelity with respect to the original model. If the
explanation was completely faithful to what the original model computes, the explanation would equal the
original model, and one would not need the original model in the first place, only the explanation. (In other words,
this is a case where the original model would be interpretable.) This leads to the danger that any explanation
method for a black box model can be an inaccurate representation of the original model in parts of the feature
space. [See also for instance, 23, among others.]
An inaccurate (low-fidelity) explanation model limits trust in the explanation, and by extension, trust in the
black box that it is trying to explain. An explainable model that has a 90% agreement with the original model
indeed explains the original model most of the time. However, an explanation model that is correct 90% of the
time is wrong 10% of the time. If a tenth of the explanations are incorrect, one cannot trust the explanations, and
thus one cannot trust the original black box. If we cannot know for certain whether our explanation is correct,
we cannot know whether to trust either the explanation or the original model.
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A more important misconception about explanations stems from the terminology “explanation,” which is
often used in a misleading way, because explanation models do not always attempt to mimic the calculations
made by the original model. Even an explanation model that performs almost identically to a black box model
might use completely different features, and is thus not faithful to the computation of the black box. Consider
a black box model for criminal recidivism prediction, where the goal is to predict whether someone will be
arrested within a certain time after being released from jail/prison. Most recidivism prediction models depend
explicitly on age and criminal history, but do not explicitly depend on race. Since criminal history and age are
correlated with race in all of our datasets, a fairly accurate explanation model could construct a rule such as “This
person is predicted to be arrested because they are black.” This might be an accurate explanation model since it
correctly mimics the predictions of the original model, but it would not be faithful to what the original model
computes. This is possibly the main flaw identified by criminologists [24] in the ProPublica analysis [25, 26] that
accused the proprietary COMPAS recidivism model of being racially biased. COMPAS (Correctional Offender
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions) is a proprietary model that is used widely in the U.S. Justice
system for parole and bail decisions. ProPublica created a linear explanation model for COMPAS that depended
on race, and then accused the black box COMPAS model of depending on race, conditioned on age and criminal
history. In fact, COMPAS seems to be nonlinear, and it is entirely possible that COMPAS does not depend on
race (beyond its correlations with age and criminal history) [27]. ProPublica’s linear model was not truly an
“explanation” for COMPAS, and they should not have concluded that their explanation model uses the same
important features as the black box it was approximating. (There will be a lot more discussion about COMPAS
later in this document.)
An easy fix to this problem is to change terminology. Let us stop calling approximations to black box model
predictions explanations. For a model that does not use race explicitly, an automated explanation “This model
predicts you will be arrested because you are black” is not an explanation of what the model is actually doing,
and would be confusing to a judge, lawyer or defendant. Recidivism prediction will be discussed more later,
as it is a key application where interpretable machine learning is necessary. In any case, it can be much easier
to detect and debate possible bias or unfairness with an interpretable model than with a black box. Similarly,
it could be easier to detect and avoid data privacy issues with interpretable models than black boxes. Just as
in the recidivism example above, many of the methods that claim to produce explanations instead compute
useful summary statistics of predictions made by the original model. Rather than producing explanations that
are faithful to the original model, they show trends in how predictions are related to the features. Calling these
“summaries of predictions,” “summary statistics,” or “trends” rather than “explanations” would be less misleading.
(iii) Explanations often do not make sense, or do not provide enough detail to understand what the black
box is doing.
Even if both models are correct (the original black box is correct in its prediction and the explanation model
is correct in its approximation of the black box’s prediction), it is possible that the explanation leaves out so much
information that it makes no sense. I will give an example from image processing, for a low-stakes decision (not
a high-stakes decision where explanations are needed, but where explanation methods are often demonstrated).
Saliency maps are often considered to be explanatory. Saliency maps can be useful to determine what part of
the image is being omitted by the classifier, but this leaves out all information about how relevant information
is being used. Knowing where the network is looking within the image does not tell the user what it is doing
with that part of the image, as illustrated in Figure 2. In fact, the saliency maps for multiple classes could be
essentially the same; in that case, the explanation for why the image might contain a Siberian husky would be
the same as the explanation for why the image might contain a transverse flute.
An unfortunate trend in recent work is to show explanations only for the observation’s correct label when
demonstrating the method (e.g., Figure 2 would not appear). Demonstrating a method using explanations only
for the correct class is misleading. This practice can instill a false sense of confidence in the explanation method
and in the black box. Consider, for instance, a case where the explanations for multiple (or all) of the classes
are identical. This situation would happen often when saliency maps are the explanations, because they tend to
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Figure 2: Saliency does not explain anything except where the network is looking. We have no idea why this
image is labeled as either a dog or a musical instrument when considering only saliency. The explanations look
essentially the same for both classes. Figure credit: Chaofan Chen and [28].
highlight edges, and thus provide similar explanations for each class. These explanations could be identical even
if the model is always wrong. Then, showing only the explanations for the image’s correct class misleads the
user into thinking that the explanation is useful, and that the black box is useful, even if neither one of them are.
Saliency maps are only one example of explanations that are so incomplete that they might not convey why
the black box predicted what it did. Similar arguments can be made with other kinds of explanation methods.
Poor explanations can make it very hard to troubleshoot a black box.
(iv) Black box models are often not compatible with situations where information outside the database
needs to be combined with a risk assessment.
In high stakes decisions, there are often considerations outside the database that need to be combined with a
risk calculation. For instance, what if the circumstances of the crime are much worse than a generic assigned
charge? There are often circumstances whose knowledge could either increase or decrease someone’s risk.
But if the model is a black box, it is very difficult to manually calibrate how much this additional information
should raise or lower the estimated risk. This issue arises constantly; for instance, the proprietary COMPAS
model used in the U.S. Justice System for recidivism risk prediction does not depend on the seriousness of
the current crime [27, 29]. Instead, the judge is instructed to somehow manually combine current crime
with COMPAS. Actually, it is possible that many judges do not know this fact. If the model were transparent,
the judge could see directly that the seriousness of the current crime is not being considered in the risk assessment.
(v) Black box models with explanations can lead to an overly complicated decision pathway that is ripe
for human error.
Typographical errors seem to be common in computing COMPAS, and these typographical errors sometimes
determine bail decision outcomes [1, 27]. This exemplifies an important drawback of using overly complicated
black box models for recidivism prediction – they may be incorrectly calculated in practice. The computation of
COMPAS requires 130+ factors. If typographical errors by humans entering these data into a survey occur at a
rate of 1%, then more than 1 out of every 2 surveys on average will have at least one typographical error. The
multitude of typographical errors has been argued to be a type of procedural unfairness, whereby two individuals
who are identical might be randomly given different parole or bail decisions. These types of errors have the
potential to reduce the in-practice accuracy of these complicated models.
On the separate topic of model troubleshooting, an overly complicated black box model may be flawed but
we do not know it, because it is difficult to troubleshoot. Having an (incomplete) explanation of it may not help,
and now we must troubleshoot two models rather than one (the black box model and the explanation model).
In the next section, we completely switch gears. We will discuss reasons why so many people appear to
advocate for black box models with separate explanation models, rather than inherently interpretable models –
even for high-stakes decisions.
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3 Key Issues with Interpretable ML
There are many cases where black boxes with explanations are preferred over interpretable models, even for
high-stakes decisions. However, for most applications, I am hopeful that there are ways around some of these
problems, whether they are computational problems, or problems with training of researchers and availability of
code. The first problem, however, is currently a major obstacle that I see no way of avoiding other than through
policy, as discussed in the next section.
(i) Corporations can make profits from the intellectual property afforded to a black box.
Companies that charge for individual predictions could find their profits obliterated if an interpretable model
were used instead.
Consider the COMPAS proprietary recidivism risk prediction tool discussed above that is in widespread use
in the U.S. Justice System for predicting the probability that someone will be arrested after their release [29].
The COMPAS model is equally accurate for recidivism prediction as the very simple three rule interpretable
machine learning model involving only age and number of past crimes shown in Figure 3 below. However, there
is no clear business model that would suggest profiting from the simple transparent model. The simple model in
Figure 3 was created from an algorithm called Certifiably Optimal Rule Lists (CORELS) that looks for if-then
patterns in data. Even though the model in Figure 3 looks like a rule of thumb that a human may have designed
without data, it is instead a full-blown machine learning model. A qualitative comparison of the COMPAS and
CORELS models is in Table 1. Standard machine learning tools and interpretable machine learning tools seem to
be approximately equally accurate for predicting recidivism, even if we define recidivism in many different ways,
for many different crime types [30, 31]. This evidence, however, has not changed the momentum of the justice
system towards proprietary models. As of this writing, California has recently eliminated its cash bail system,
instead enforcing that decisions be made by algorithms; it is unclear whether COMPAS will be the algorithm
used for this, despite the fact that it is not known to be any more accurate than other models, such as the simple
CORELS model in Figure 3.
IF age between 18-20 and sex is male THEN predict arrest (within 2 years)
ELSE IF age between 21-23 and 2-3 prior offenses THEN predict arrest
ELSE IF more than three priors THEN predict arrest
ELSE predict no arrest.
Figure 3: This is a machine learning model from the Certifiably Optimal Rule Lists (CORELS) algorithm [32].
This model is the minimizer of a special case of Equation 1 discussed later in the challenges section. CORELS’
code is open source and publicly available at http://corels.eecs.harvard.edu/, along with the data from Florida
needed to produce this model.
COMPAS CORELS
black box full model is in Figure 3
130+ factors only age, priors, (optional) gender
might include socio-economic info no other information
expensive (software license), free, transparent
within software used in U.S. Justice System
Table 1: Comparison of COMPAS and CORELS models. Both models have similar true and false positive rates
and true and false negative rates on data from Broward County, Florida.
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COMPAS is not a machine learning model – it was not created by any standard machine learning algorithm.
It was designed by experts based on carefully designed surveys and expertise, and it does not seem to depend
heavily on past criminal history [27]. Interestingly, if the COMPAS model were not proprietary, its documentation
[29] indicates that it would actually be an interpretable predictive model. (It is a black box of the second type –
proprietary – but not the first type – complicated – discussed above.) Revealing this model, however, would be
revealing a trade secret.
Let us switch examples to consider the proprietary machine learning model by BreezoMeter, used by Google
during the California wildfires of 2018, which predicted air quality as “good – ideal air quality for outdoor
activities,” when air quality was dangerously bad according to multiple other models [2], and people reported
their cars covered in ash. The Environmental Protection Agency’s free, vigorously-tested air quality index would
have provided a reliable result [33]. How could BreezoMeter’s machine learning method be so badly wrong and
put so many in danger? We will never find out, but BreezoMeter, who has probably made a profit from making
these predictions, may not have developed this new technology if its models were forced to be transparent.
In medicine, there is a trend towards blind acceptance of black box models, which will open the door for
companies to sell more models to hospitals. For instance, radiology and in-hospital patient monitoring are areas
of medicine that stand to gain tremendously by automation; humans cannot process data fast enough or rapidly
enough to compete with machines. However, in trusting these automated systems, we must also trust the full
database on which they were trained, the processing of the data, along with the completeness of the database. If
the database does not represent the full set of possible situations that can arise, then the model could be making
predictions in cases that are very different from anything it was trained on. An example of where this can go
wrong is given by Zech et al. [34], who noticed that their neural network was picking up on the word “portable”
within an x-ray image, representing the type of x-ray equipment rather than the medical content of the image. If
they had used an interpretable model, or even an explainable model, this issue would never have gone unnoticed.
Zech et al. [34] pointed out the issue of confounding generally; in fact, the plague of confounding haunts a vast
number of datasets, and particularly medical datasets. This means that proprietary models for medicine can have
serious errors. These models can also be fragile, in that if the model is used in practice in a slightly different
setting than how it was trained (e.g., new x-ray equipment), accuracy can substantially drop.
The examples of COMPAS, Breezometer, and black box medical diagnosis all illustrate a problem with the
business model for machine learning. In particular, there is a conflict of responsibility in the use of black box
models for high-stakes decisions: the companies that profit from these models are not necessarily responsible for
the quality of individual predictions. A prisoner serving an excessively long sentence due to a mistake entered in
an overly-complicated risk score could suffer for years, whereas the company that constructed this complicated
model is unaffected. On the contrary, the fact that the model was complicated and proprietary allowed the
company to profit from it. In that sense, the model’s designers are not incentivized to be careful in its design,
performance, and ease of use. These are some of the same types of problems affecting the credit rating agencies
who priced mortgages in 2008; that is, these are the same problems that contributed to the financial crisis in the
United States at that time.
One argument favoring black boxes is that keeping these models hidden prevents them from being gamed or
reverse-engineered. It is not clear that this argument generally makes sense. In fact, the reason a system may be
gamed is because it most likely was not designed properly in the first place, leading to a form of Goodhart’s law
if it were revealed. Quoting from Chang et al. [35] about product rating systems: “If the ratings are accurate
measures of quality, then making the ratings more transparent could have a uniformly positive impact: it would
help companies to make better rated products, it would help consumers to have these higher quality products,
and it would encourage rating companies to receive feedback as to whether their rating systems fairly represent
quality.” Thus, transparency could help improve the quality of the system, whereby attempting to game it would
genuinely align with the overall goal of improvement. For instance, improving one’s credit score should actually
correspond to an improvement in creditworthiness.
Another argument favoring black boxes is the belief that “counterfactual explanations” of black boxes are
sufficient. A counterfactual explanation describes a minimal change to the input that would result in the opposite
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prediction. For instance, a possible counterfactual explanation might be “your loan application was denied, but if
you had $1000 less debt, you would have qualified for the loan.” This type of explanation can suffer from key
issue (iv) discussed above, about combining information outside the database with the black box. In particular,
the “minimal” change to the input might be different for different individuals. Appendix C discusses in more
depth why counterfactual explanations generally do not suffice for high stakes decisions of black boxes.
(ii) Interpretable models can entail significant effort to construct, in terms of both computation and
domain expertise.
As discussed above, interpretability usually translates in practice to a set of application-specific constraints
on the model. Solving constrained problems is generally harder than solving unconstrained problems. Domain
expertise is needed to construct the definition of interpretability for the domain, and the features for machine
learning. For data that are unconfounded, complete, and clean, it is much easier to use a black box machine
learning method than to troubleshoot and solve computationally hard problems. However, for high-stakes
decisions, analyst time and computational time are less expensive than the cost of having a flawed or overly
complicated model. That is, it is worthwhile to devote extra effort and cost into constructing a high-quality
model. But even so, many organizations do not have analysts who have the training or expertise to construct
interpretable models at all.
Some companies have started to provide interpretable ML solutions using proprietary software. While
this is a step in the right direction, it is not clear that the proprietary software is better than publicly available
software. For instance, claims made by some companies about performance of their proprietary algorithms
are not impressive (e.g., Interpretable AI, whose decision tree performance using mixed integer programming
software in 2017 is reported to be often beaten by or comparable to the 1984 Classification and Regression Tree
algorithm, CART).
As discussed earlier, interpretability constraints (like sparsity) lead to optimization problems that have
been proven to be computationally hard in the worst case. The theoretical hardness of these problems does
not mean we cannot solve them, though in real cases, these optimization problems are often difficult to solve.
Major improvements have been made in the last decade, and some are discussed later in the Challenges section.
Explanation methods, on the other hand, are usually based on derivatives, which lead to easier gradient-based
optimization.
(iii) Black box models seem to uncover “hidden patterns.”
The fact that many scientists have difficulty constructing interpretable models may be fueling the belief that
black boxes have the ability to uncover subtle hidden patterns in the data that the user was not previously aware
of. A transparent model may be able to uncover these same patterns. If the pattern in the data was important
enough that a black box model could leverage it to obtain better predictions, an interpretable model might also
locate the same pattern and use it. Again, this depends on the machine learning researcher’s ability to create
accurate-yet-interpretable models. The researcher needs to create a model that has the capability of uncovering
the types of patterns that the user would find interpretable, but also the model needs to be flexible enough to fit
the data accurately. This, and the optimization challenges discussed above, are where the difficulty lies with
constructing interpretable models.
4 Encouraging Responsible ML Governance
Currently the European Union’s revolutionary General Data Protection Regulation and other AI regulation
plans govern “right to an explanation,” where only an explanation is required, not an interpretable model [36],
in particular “The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated
processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly
affects him or her” (Article 22 of GDPR regulations from http://www.privacy-regulation.eu/en/
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22.htm). If one were to provide an explanation for an automated decision, it is not clear whether the explanation
is required to be accurate, complete, or faithful to the underlying model [e.g., see 37]. Less-than-satisfactory
explanations can easily undermine these new policies.
Let us consider a possible mandate that, for certain high-stakes decisions, no black box should be deployed
when there exists an interpretable model with the same level of performance. If such a mandate were deployed,
organizations that produce and sell black box models could then be held accountable if an equally accurate
transparent model exists. It could be considered a form of false advertising to sell a black box model if there is
an equally-accurate interpretable model. The onus would then fall on organizations to produce black box models
only when no transparent model exists for the same task.
This possible mandate could produce a change in the business model for machine learning. Opacity is
viewed as essential in protecting intellectual property, but it is at odds with the requirements of many domains
that involve public health or welfare. However, the combination of opacity and explainability is not the only
way to incentivize machine learning experts to invest in creating such systems. Compensation for developing an
interpretable model could be provided in a lump sum, and the model could be released to the public. The creator
of the model would not be able to profit from licensing the model over a period of time, but the fact that the
models are useful for public good applications would make these problems appeal to academics and charitable
foundations.
This proposal will not solve all problems, but it could at least rule out companies selling recidivism
prediction models, possibly credit scoring models, and other kinds of models where we can construct accurate-
yet-interpretable alternatives. If applied too broadly, it could reduce industrial participation in cases where
machine learning might benefit society.
Consider a second proposal, which is weaker than the one provided above, but which might have a similar
effect. Let us consider the possibility that organizations that introduce black box models would be mandated to
report the accuracy of interpretable modeling methods. In that case, one could more easily determine whether the
accuracy/interpretability trade-off claimed by the organization is worthwhile. This also forces the organization to
try using interpretable modeling methods. It also encourages the organization to use these methods carefully,
otherwise risking the possibility of criticism.
As mentioned earlier, I have not yet found a high-stakes application where a fully black box model is
necessary, despite having worked on many applications. As long as we continue to allow for a broad definition
of interpretability that is adapted to the domain, we should be able to improve decision making for serious tasks
of societal importance. However, in order for people to design interpretable models, the technology must exist to
do so. As discussed earlier, there is a formidable computational hurdle in designing interpretable models, even
for standard structured data with already-meaningful features.
5 Algorithmic Challenges in Interpretable ML
What if every black box machine learning model could be replaced with one that was equally accurate but
also interpretable? If we could do this, we would identify flaws in our models and data that we could not see
before. Perhaps we could prevent some of the poor decisions in criminal justice and medicine that are caused by
problems with using black box models. We could also eliminate the need for explanations that are misleading
and often wrong.
Since interpretability is domain-specific, a large toolbox of possible techniques can come in handy. Below
we expand on three of the challenges for interpretable machine learning that appear often. All three cases
have something in common: people have been providing interpretable predictive models for these problems
for decades, and the human-designed models look just like the type of model we want to create with machine
learning. I also discuss some of our current work on these well-known problems.
Each of these challenges is a representative from a major class of models: modeling that uses logical
conditions (Challenge 1), linear modeling (Challenge 2), and case-based reasoning (Challenge 3). By no means
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is this set of challenges close to encompassing the large number of domain-specific challenges that exist in
creating interpretable models.
Challenge #1: Constructing optimal logical models
A logical model consists of statements involving “or,” “and,” “if-then,” etc. The CORELS model in Figure 3 is a
logical model, called a rule list. Decision trees are logical models, as well as conjunctions of disjunctions (“or’s”
of “and’s” – for instance, IF condition A is true OR conditions B AND C are true, THEN predict yes, otherwise
predict no).
Logical models have been crafted by hand as expert systems as far back as the 1970’s. Since then, there
have been many heuristics for creating logical models; for instance, one might add logical conditions one by
one (greedily), and then prune conditions away that are not helpful (again, greedily). These heuristic methods
tend to be inaccurate and/or uninterpretable because they do not choose a globally best choice (or approximately
best choice) for the logical conditions, and are not designed to be optimally sparse. They might use 200 logical
conditions when the same accuracy could be obtained with 5 logical conditions. [C4.5 and CART 38, 39,
decision trees suffer from these problems, as well as a vast number of models from the associative classification
literature]. An issue with algorithms that do not aim for optimal (or near-optimal) solutions to optimization
problems is that it becomes difficult to tell whether poor performance is due to the choice of algorithm or the
combination of the choice of model class and constraints. (Did the algorithm perform poorly because it did not
optimize its objective, or because we chose constraints that do not allow enough flexibility in the model to fit the
data well?) The question of computing optimal logical models has existed since at least the mid 1990’s [40].
We would like models that look like they are created by hand, but they need to be accurate, full-blown
machine learning models. To this end, let us consider the following optimization problem, which asks us to find
a model that minimizes a combination of the fraction of misclassified training points and the size of the model.
Training observations are indexed from i = 1, .., n, and F is a family of logical models such as decision trees.
The optimization problem is:
min
f∈F
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
1[training observation i is misclassified by f ] + λ× size(f)
)
. (1)
Here, the size of the model can be measured by the number of logical conditions in the model, such as the
number of leaves in a decision tree. The parameter λ is the classification error one would sacrifice in order to
have one fewer term in the model; if λ is 0.01, it means we would sacrifice 1% training accuracy in order to
reduce the size of the model by one. Another way to say this is that the model would contain an additional term
only if this additional term reduced the error by at least 1%.
The optimization problem in (1) is generally known to be computationally hard. Versions of this optimization
problem are some of the fundamental problems of artificial intelligence. The challenge is whether we can solve
(or approximately solve) problems like this in practical ways, by leveraging new theoretical techniques and
advances in hardware.
The model in Figure 3 is a machine learning model that comes from the CORELS algorithm [32]. CORELS
solves a special case of (1), for the special choice of F as the set of rule lists, and where the size of the model
is measured by the number of rules in the list. Figure 3 has three “if-then” rules so its size is 3. In order to
minimize (1), CORELS needs to avoid enumerating all possible models, because this would take an extremely
long time (perhaps until the end of the universe on a modern laptop for a fairly small dataset). The technology
underlying the CORELS algorithm was able to solve the optimization problem to optimality in under a minute
for the Broward County, FL, dataset discussed above. CORELS’ backbone is: (i) a set of theorems allowing
massive reductions in the search space of rule lists, (ii) a custom fast bit-vector library that allows fast exploration
of the search space, so that CORELS does not need to enumerate all rule lists, and (iii) specialized data structures
that keep track of intermediate computations and symmetries. This set of ingredients proved to be a powerful
cocktail for handling these tough computational problems.
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The example of CORELS enforces two points discussed above, which are, first, that interpretable models
sometimes entail hard computational problems, and second, that these computational problems can be solved
by leveraging a combination of theoretical and systems-level techniques. CORELS creates one type of logical
model; however, there are many more. Formally, the first challenge is to create algorithms that solve logical
modeling problems in a reasonable amount of time, for practical datasets.
We have been extending CORELS to more complex problems, such as Falling Rule Lists [41, 42], and
optimal binary-split decision trees, but there is much work to be done on other types of logical models, with
various kinds of constraints.
Note that it is possible to construct interpretable logical models for which the global model is large, and yet
each explanation is small. This is discussed in Appendix D.
Challenge #2: Construct optimal sparse scoring systems
Scoring systems have been designed by hand since at least the Burgess criminological model of 1928 [43]. The
Burgess model was designed to predict whether a criminal would violate bail, where individuals received points
for being a “ne’er do well” or a “recent immigrant” that increased their predicted probability of parole violation.
(Of course, this model was not created using machine learning, which had not been invented yet.) A scoring
system is a sparse linear model with integer coefficients – the coefficients are the point scores. An example of a
scoring system for criminal recidivism is shown in Figure 4, which predicts whether someone will be arrested
within 3 years of release. Scoring systems are used pervasively throughout medicine; there are hundreds of
scoring systems developed by physicians. Again, the challenge is whether scoring systems – which look like
they could have been produced by a human in the absence of data – can be produced by a machine learning
algorithm, and be as accurate as any other model from any other machine learning algorithm.
Figure 4: Scoring system for risk of recidivism from [21] [which grew out of 30, 44, 45]. This model was not
created by a human; the selection of numbers and features come from the RiskSLIM machine learning algorithm.
There are several ways to formulate the problem of producing a scoring system [see, e.g., 46, 47]. For
instance, we could use a special case of (1), where the model size is the number of terms in the model. (Figure 4
is a machine learning model with 5 terms.) Sometimes, one can round the coefficients of a logistic regression
model to produce a scoring system, but that method does not tend to give accurate models, and does not tend to
produce models that have particularly nice coefficients (such as 1 and -1 used in Figure 4). However, solving (1)
or its variants is computationally hard, because the domain over which we solve the optimization problem is the
integer lattice. (To see this, consider an axis for each of {b1, b2, ..., bp}, where each bj can take on integer values.
This is a lattice that defines the feasible region of the optimization problem.)
The model in Figure 4 arose from the solution to a very hard optimization problem. Let us discuss this
optimization problem briefly. The goal is to find the coefficients bj , j = 1...p for the linear predictive model
f(z) =
∑
j bjzj where zj is the jth covariate of a test observation z. In Figure 4, the bj’s are the point scores,
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which turned out to be 1, -1, and 0 as a result of optimization, where only the nonzero coefficients are displayed
in the figure. In particular, we want to solve:
min
b1,b2,..,bp∈{−10,−9,...,9,10}
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
1 + exp
− p∑
j=1
bjxi,j
+ λ∑
j
1[bj 6=0],
where the point scores bj are constrained to be integers between -10 and 10, the training observations are indexed
by i = 1, ..., n, and p is the total number of covariates for our data. Here the model size is the number of
non-zero coefficients, and again λ is the trade-off parameter. The first term is the logistic loss used in logistic
regression. The problem is hard, specifically it is a mixed-integer-nonlinear program (MINLP) whose domain is
the integer lattice.
Despite the hardness of this problem, new cutting plane algorithms have been able to solve this problem to
optimality (or near-optimality) for arbitrarily large sample sizes and a moderate number of variables within a few
minutes. The latest attempt at solving this problem is the RiskSLIM (Risk-Supersparse-Linear-Integer-Models)
algorithm, which is a specialized cutting plane method that adds cutting planes only whenever the solution to a
linear program is integer-valued, and otherwise performs branching [44].
This optimization problem is similar to what physicians attempt to solve manually, but without writing
the optimization problem down like we did above. Because physicians do not use optimization tools to do
this, accurate scoring systems tend to be difficult for physicians to create themselves from data. One of our
collaborators spent months trying to construct a scoring system himself by adding and removing variables,
rounding, and using other heuristics to decide which variables to add, remove, and round. RiskSLIM was useful
for helping him with this task [48]. Formally, the second challenge is to create algorithms for scoring systems
that are computationally efficient. Ideally we would increase the size of the optimal scoring system problems
that current methods can practically handle by an order of magnitude.
Challenge #3 Define interpretability for specific domains and create methods accordingly, including com-
puter vision
Since interpretability needs to be defined in a domain-specific way, some of the most important technical
challenges for the future are tied to specific important domains. Let us start with computer vision, for classification
of images. There is a vast and growing body of research on posthoc explainability of deep neural networks, but
not as much work in designing interpretable neural networks. My goal in this section is to demonstrate that even
for classic domains of machine learning, where latent representations of data need to be constructed, there could
exist interpretable models that are as accurate as black box models.
For computer vision in particular, there is not a clear definition of interpretability, and the sparsity-related
models discussed above do not apply – sparsity in pixel space does not make sense. There can be many different
ideas of what constitutes interpretability, even between different computer vision applications. However, if
we can define interpretability somehow for our particular application, we can embed this definition into our
algorithm.
Let us define what constitutes interpretability by considering how people explain to each other the reasoning
processes behind complicated visual classification tasks. As it turns out, for classification of natural images,
domain experts often direct our attention to different parts of the image and explain why these parts of the image
were important in their reasoning process. The question is whether we can construct network architectures for
deep learning that can also do this. The network must then make decisions by reasoning about parts of the image
so that the explanations are real, and not posthoc.
In a recent attempt to do this, Chen, Li, and colleagues have been building architectures that append a special
prototype layer to the end of the network [49, 55]. During training, the prototype layer finds parts of training
images that act as prototypes for each class. For instance, for bird classification, the prototype layer might pick
out a prototypical head of a blue jay, prototypical feathers of a blue jay, etc. The network also learns a similarity
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Figure 5: Image from the authors of [49], indicating that parts of the test image on the left are similar to
prototypical parts of training examples. The test image to be classified is on the left, the most similar prototypes
are in the middle column, and the heatmaps that show which part of the test image is similar to the prototype are
on the right. We included copies of the test image on the right so that it is easier to see what part of the bird the
heatmaps are referring to. The similarities of the prototypes to the test image are what determine the predicted
class label of the image. Here, the image is predicted to be a clay-colored sparrow. The top prototype seems to
be comparing the bird’s head to a prototypical head of a clay-colored sparrow, the second prototype considers
the throat of the bird, the third looks at feathers, and the last seems to consider the abdomen and leg. Test image
from [50]. Prototypes from [51, 52, 53, 54]. Image constructed by Alina Barnett.
metric between parts of images. Thus, during testing, when a new test image needs to be evaluated, the network
finds parts of the test image that are similar to the prototypes it learned during training, as shown in Figure 5.
The final class prediction of the network is based on the weighted sum of similarities to the prototypes; this is
the sum of evidence throughout the image for a particular class. The explanations given by the network are the
prototypes (and the weighted similarities to them). These explanations are the actual computations of the model,
and these are not posthoc explanations. The network is called “This look like that” because its reasoning process
considers whether “this” part of the image looks like “that” prototype.
Training this prototype network is not as easy as training an ordinary neural network; the tricks that have
been developed for regular deep learning have not yet been developed for the prototype network. However, so
far these prototype networks have been trained to be approximately as accurate as the original black box deep
neural networks they were derived from, before the prototype layer was added.
Discussion on Interpretability for Specific Domains
Let us finish this short discussion on challenges to interpretability for specific domains by mentioning that
there are vast numbers of papers that have imbued interpretability in their methodology. Interpretability is not
mentioned in the title of these papers, and often not in the body of the text. This is why it is almost impossible to
create a review article on interpretability in machine learning or statistics without missing the overwhelming
majority of it.
It is not clear why review articles for interpretability and explainability make sense to create. We do
not normally have reviews of performance/accuracy measures, despite the fact that there are many of them –
accuracy, area under the ROC curve, partial AUC, sensitivity, specificity, discounted cumulative gain, F-score,
G-means, and many other domain-specific measures. Interpretability/explainability is just as domain-specific
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as accuracy performance, so it is not clear why reviews of interpretability make any more sense than reviews
of accuracy/performance. I have yet to find even a single recent review that recognized the chasm between
interpretability and explainability.
Let us discuss very briefly some of examples of work on interpretability that would not have been covered by
recent review articles, and yet are valuable contributions to interpretability in their respective domains. Gallagher
et al. [56] analyze brain-wide electrical spatiotemporal dynamics to understand depression vulnerability and
find interpretable patterns in a low dimensional space. Dimension reduction to interpretable dimensions is an
important theme in interpretable machine learning. Problems residing in applied statistics are often interpretable
because they embed the physics of the domain; e.g., Wang et al. [57] create models for recovery curves for
prostatectomy patients whose signal and uncertainty obey specific constraints in order to be realistic. Constraints
on the uncertainty of the predictions make these models interpretable.
The setup of the recent 2018 FICO Explainable ML Challenge exemplified the blind belief in the myth of the
accuracy/interpretability tradeoff for a specific domain, namely credit scoring. Entrants were instructed to create
a black box to predict credit default and explain the model afterwards. However, there was no performance
difference between interpretable models and explainable models for the FICO data. A globally interpretable
model [22] won the FICO Recognition Prize for the competition. This is a case where the organizers and judges
had not expected an interpretable model to be able to be constructed and thus did not ask entrants to try to
construct such a model. The model of [22] was an additive model, which is a known form of interpretable model
[see also 9, 58, where additive models are used for medical data]. Additive models could be optimized using
similar techniques to those introduced in Challenge 2 above.
A Technical Reason Why Accurate Interpretable Models Might Exist in Many Domains
Why is it that accurate interpretable models could possibly exist in so many different domains? Is it really
possible that many aspects of nature have simple truths that are waiting to be discovered by machine learning?
Although that would be intriguing, I will not make this kind of Occham’s-Razor-style argument, in favor of a
technical argument about function classes, and in particular, Rashomon Sets. The argument below is fleshed
out more formally in [59]. This is related to (but different from) the notation of “flat minima,” for which a nice
example is given by Hand [19].
Here is the Rashomon set argument: Consider that the data permit a large set of reasonably accurate
predictive models to exist. Because this set of accurate models is large, it often contains at least one model that
is interpretable. This model is thus both interpretable and accurate.
Unpacking this argument slightly, for a given data set, we define the Rashomon set as the set of reasonably
accurate predictive models (say within a given accuracy from the best model accuracy of boosted decision trees).
Because the data are finite, the data could admit many close-to-optimal models that predict differently from
each other: a large Rashomon set. I suspect this happens often in practice because sometimes many different
machine learning algorithms perform similarly on the same dataset, despite having different functional forms
(e.g., random forests, neural networks, support vector machines). As long as the Rashomon set contains a large
enough set of models with diverse predictions, it probably contains functions that can be approximated well
by simpler functions, and so the Rashomon set can also contain these simpler functions. Said another way,
uncertainty arising from the data leads to a Rashomon set, a larger Rashomon set probably contains interpretable
models, thus interpretable accurate models often exist.
If this theory holds, we should expect to see interpretable models exist across domains. These interpretable
models may be hard to find through optimization, but at least there is a reason we might expect that such models
exist.
If there are many diverse yet good models, it means that algorithms may not be stable; an algorithm might
choose one model, and a small change to that algorithm or to the dataset may yield a completely different (but
still accurate) model. This is not necessarily a bad thing, in fact, the availability of diverse good models means
that domain experts may have more flexibility in choosing a model that they find interpretable. Appendix E
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discusses this in slightly more detail.
6 Conclusion
If this commentary can shift the focus even slightly from the basic assumption underlying most work in
Explainable ML – which is that a black box is necessary for accurate predictions – we will have considered this
document a success.
If this document can encourage policy makers not to accept black box models without significant attempts at
interpretable (rather than explainable) models, that would be even better.
If we can make people aware of the current challenges right now in interpretable machine learning, it will
allow policy-makers the mechanism to demand that more effort should be made in ensuring safety and trust in
our machine learning models for high-stakes decisions.
If we do not succeed at these efforts, it is possible that black box models will continue to be permitted
when it is not safe to use them. Since the definition of what constitutes a viable explanation is unclear, even
strong regulations such as “right to explanation” can be undermined with less-than-satisfactory explanations.
Further, there will continue to be problems combining black box model predictions with information outside the
database, and continued miscalculations of black box model inputs. This may continue to lead to poor decisions
throughout our criminal justice system, incorrect safety guidance for air quality disasters, incomprehensible loan
decisions, and other widespread societal problems.
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A On the Two Types of Black Box
Black box models of the first type are too complicated for a human to comprehend, and black box models of the second
type are proprietary. Some models are of both types. The consequences of these two types of black box are different, but
related. For instance, for a black box model that is complicated but not proprietary, we at least know what variables it
uses. We also know the model form and could use that to attempt to analyze the different parts of the model. For a black
box model that is proprietary but not complicated [we have evidence that COMPAS is such a model, 27], we may not
even have access to query it in order to study it. If a proprietary model is too sparse, there is a risk that it could be easily
reverse-engineered, thus there is an incentive to make proprietary models complicated in order to preserve their secrecy.
B Performance Comparisons
For most problems with meaningful structured covariates, machine learning algorithms tend to perform similarly, with no
algorithm clearly dominating the others. The variation due to tuning parameters of a single algorithm can often be higher
than the variation between algorithms. This lack of single dominating algorithm for structured data is arguably why the
field of machine learning focuses on image and speech recognition, whose data are represented in raw features (pixels,
sound files); these are fields for which the choice of algorithm impacts performance. Even for complex domains such
as medical records, it has been reported in some studies that logistic regression has identical performance to deep neural
networks [e.g. 60].
If there is no dominating algorithm, the Rashomon Set argument discussed above would suggest that interpretable
models might perform well.
Unfortunately the culture of publication within machine learning favors selective reporting of algorithms on selectively
chosen datasets. Papers are often rejected if small or no performance gains are reported between algorithms. This
encourages omission of accurate baselines for comparison, as well as omission of datasets on which the method does not
perform well, and encourages authors to poorly tune the parameters of baseline methods, or equivalently, place more effort
into tuning the parameters of the author’s own method. This creates an illusion of large performance differences between
algorithms, even when such performance differences do not truly exist.
C Counterfactual Explanations
Some have argued that counterfactual explanations [e.g., see 37] are a way for black boxes to provide useful information
while preserving secrecy of the global model. Counterfactual explanations, also called inverse classification, state a change
in features that is sufficient (but not necessary) for the prediction to switch to another class (e.g., “If you reduced your
debt by $5000 and increased your savings by $50% then you would have qualified for the loan you applied for”). This is
important for recourse in certain types of decisions, meaning that the user could take an action to reverse a decision [61].
There are several problems with the argument that counterfactual explanations are sufficient. For loan applications, for
instance, we would want the counterfactual explanation to provide the lowest cost action for the user to take, according
to the user’s own cost metric. [See 35, for an example of lowest-cost counterfactual reasoning in product rankings]. In
other words, let us say that there is more than one counterfactual explanation available (e.g., the first explanation is “If you
reduced your debt by $5000 and increased your savings by $50% then you would have qualified for the loan you applied
for” and the second explanation is “If you had gotten a job that pays $500 more per week, then you would have qualified
for the loan”). In that case, the explanation shown to the user should be the easiest one for the user to actually accomplish.
However, it is unclear in advance which explanation would be easier for the user to accomplish. In the credit example,
perhaps it is easier for the user to save money rather than get a job or vice versa. In order to determine which explanation is
the lowest cost for the user, we would need to elicit cost information for the user, and that cost information is generally very
difficult to obtain; worse, the cost information could actually change as the user attempts to follow the policy provided
by the counterfactual explanation (e.g., it turns out to be harder than the user thought to get a salary increase). For that
reason it is unclear that counterfactual explanations would suffice for high stakes decisions. Additionally, counterfactual
explanations of black boxes have many of the other pitfalls discussed throughout this paper.
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D Interpretable Models that Provide Smaller-Than-Global Explanations
It is possible to create a global model (perhaps a complicated one) for which explanations for any given individual are
very sparse. In other words, even if the global model would take several pages of text to write, the prediction for a given
individual can be very simple to calculate (perhaps requiring only 1-2 conditions). Let us consider the case of credit risk
prediction. Assume we do not need to justify to the client why we would grant a loan, but we would need to justify why we
would deny a loan.
Let us consider a disjunctive normal form model, which is a collection of “or’s” of “and’s.” For instance, the model
might deny a loan if “(credit history too short AND at least one bad past trade) OR (at least 4 bad past trades) OR (at least
one recent delinquency AND high percentage of delinquent trades).” Even if we had hundreds of conjunctions within
the model, only one of these needs to be shown to the client; if any conjunction is true, that conjunction is a defining
reason why the client would be denied a loan. In other words, if the client had “at least one recent delinquency AND high
percentage of delinquent trades,” then regardless of any other aspects of her credit history, she could be shown that simple
explanation, and it would be a defining reason why her loan application would be denied.
Disjunctive normal form models are well-studied, and are called by various names, such as “or’s of and’s,” as well as
“decision rules,” “rule sets” and “associative classifiers.” There has been substantial work in being able to generate such
models over the past few years so that the models are globally interpretable, not just locally interpretable (meaning that the
global model consists of a small number of conjunctions) [e.g., see 62, 63, 64, 65, 66].
There are many other types of models that would provide smaller-than-global explanations. For instance, falling rule
lists [41, 42] provide shorter explanations for the decisions that are most important. For instance, a falling rule list for
predicting patient mortality would use few logical conditions to categorize whether a patient is in a high-risk group, but use
several additional logical conditions to determine which low-risk group a patient falls into.
E Algorithm Stability
A common criticism of decision trees is that they are not stable, meaning that small changes in the training data lead to
completely different trees, giving no guidance as to which tree to choose. In fact, the same problem can happen in linear
models when there are highly correlated features. This can happen even in basic least squares, where correlations between
features can lead to very different models having precisely the same levels of performance. When there are correlated
features, the lack of stability happens with most algorithms that are not strongly regularized.
I hypothesize this instability in the learning algorithm could be a side-effect of the Rashomon effect mentioned earlier
– that there are many different almost-equally good predictive models. Adding regularization to an algorithm increases
stability, but also limits flexibility of the user to choose which element of the Rashomon set would be more desirable.
For applications where the models are purely predictive and not causal (e.g., in criminal recidivism where we use age
and prior criminal history to predict future crime), there is no assumption that the model represents how outcomes are
actually generated. The importance of the variables in the model does not reflect a causal relationship between the variables
and the outcomes. Thus, without additional guidance from the domain expert, there is no way to proceed further to choose
a single “best model” among the set of models that perform similarly. As discussed above, regularization can act as this
additional input.
I view the lack of algorithmic stability as an advantage rather than a disadvantage. If the lack of stability is indeed
caused by a large Rashomon effect, it means that domain experts can add more constraints to the model to customize it
without losing accuracy.
In other words, while many people criticize methods such as decision trees for not being stable, I view that as a strength
of interpretability for decision trees. If there are many equally accurate trees, the domain expert can pick the one that is the
most interpretable.
Note that not all researchers working in interpretability agree with this general sentiment about the advantages of
instability [67].
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